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Abstract We examine the effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry in 83 
economies over the 2005–2013 period. The empirical findings show that foreign bank 
presence exerts a positive and significant effect on firm entry. This effect subsides in 
countries with strong creditor rights, while it strengthens in economies with high depth of 
credit information sharing. In further analysis, we find that the type of credit information 
sharing provider matters. The positive effect of foreign bank presence on firm entry 
strengthens in the presence of a private credit bureau, whereas it is subdued in the presence 
of a public credit registry. Finally, we find some evidence that cultural and information 
sharing distance between home and host econo-mies weakens the positive effect of foreign 
bank presence on firm entry. In terms of policy, attracting foreign banks while 
strengthening credit information sharing through private credit bureaus could benefit 
entrepreneurship in host economies.
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1 Introduction
The globalization of business is a major feature of the global economy. The banking sector is not an
exception to this trend. Claessens andVanHoren (2014a, 2015) show a growing presence of foreign
banks in most economies from 1995 to 2013. As a result, academics and policy makers are keen to
investigate the effect of foreign banks on the performance of the banking sector and on credit
allocation in the host economies. This paper relates to the latter strand of the foreign banking
literature as it examines the effect of foreign bank presence on entrepreneurship in a cross-country
empirical framework. In essence, we attempt to answer the question: Does foreign bank presence
promote or inhibit new firm entry?
This question is of importance given the increase in foreign bank presence worldwide and the
benefits of entrepreneurship for development. Entrepreneurship is a key contributor to the economic
growth and dynamism of a country (Caves 1998; Bartelsman et al. 2004). It could increase
competition (Cohen and Klepper 1992); the transfer of resources from low to high productivity
activities (Bartelsman et al. 2003) and the generation, dissemination and application of innovative
ideas that enhance firm productivity (Nickell 1996). Furthermore, entrepreneurship decreases the
unemployment rate (Branstetter et al. 2014; Siemer 2014). These benefits of entrepreneurship have
induced policymakers, especially in the aftermath of the crisis, to place policies that encourage new
firm creation in the top of their agenda (Klapper and Love 2011a).
Given the significance of entrepreneurship in the policy agenda, there is a burgeoning research on
the determinants of cross-country heterogeneity in the rate of new firm entry (Djankov et al. 2002;
Klapper et al. 2006; Bruno et al. 2013; Ardagna and Lusardi 2010; Da Rin et al. 2011; Klapper and
Love 2014; Klapper et al. 2015). These studies concentrate on the effect of business regulations such
as entry regulation and taxation as well institutional quality on new firm entry. Most of this research
employs access to finance as a control variable, usually proxied by the level of financial develop-
ment, and find that it has a positive associationwith entrepreneurship. Another strand of the literature
relates explicitly to the effect of the structure of the financial industry on new firm entry (Cetorelli
and Strahan 2006; Bonaccorsi di Patti andDell’Ariccia 2004;Aghion et al. 2007). These studies find
that more competition in the banking industry, as well as a higher level of private credit, has a
positive effect on new firm entry. Thus, there is a consensus in the literature that financing conditions
matter for entrepreneurship. However, the presence of foreign banks, an important aspect of cross-
country variation in financing conditions, has not been adequately examined with regards to its
impact on entrepreneurship rates.1
1 To the best our knowledge there is only one study (Havrylchyk 2012) that examines the impact of foreign bank
presence on entrepreneurship for a sample of transition economies over the 2000–2005. However, there are some
important differences between this paper and ours. The study of Havrylchyk (2012) focuses on few transition
economies, whereas our paper uses a global sample of 83 economies. Secondly, we utilize the recent foreign bank
ownership dataset of Claessens and van Horen (2014a, 2015). This dataset represent the most diligent effort to
measure accurately cross-country foreign bank presence. Thirdly and more importantly, our study takes into
account conditioning effects due to important institutional arrangements (creditor rights and credit information
sharing) that aim to alleviate the information asymmetry between banks and candidate borrowers. Finally, the
study of Havrylchyk (2012) is for the 2000–2005 period while the timeline of our study (2005–2013) is wider
and also includes the crisis and some of the post-crisis period.
The extant literature on the effect of foreign banks’ presence on access to firm
credit points into two directions. This first is that foreign banks due to geographic and
cultural distance constraints (Mian 2006), their hierarchical structure (Stein 2002) and
their reliance on lending technologies that depend on Bhard^ financial information
(Beck et al. 2016) face a high degree of information asymmetry especially vis-à-vis
small, young and opaque domestic borrowers. In line with this direction, a stream of
studies finds that foreign bank presence benefits the access to finance for borrowers
that are foreign, large and more transparent (Detragiache et al. 2008; Brown et al.
2011; Pennathur and Vishwasrao 2014). The second is that foreign banks have
developed advanced lending technologies, such as credit scoring as well as leasing
and asset-based lending, designed to serve opaque domestic borrowers (Berger and
Udell 2006; De Haas and Naaborg 2006; De la Torre et al. 2010). Therefore, foreign
banks could overcome the information asymmetries between them and opaque bor-
rowers and thus improve access to credit for the latter. Furthermore, foreign banks
could benefit access to credit for opaque borrowers indirectly by forcing domestic
banks to shift their credit portfolios towards the latter (Degryse et al. 2012). A stream
of studies provides empirical evidence that foreign bank presence improves the access
to finance also for smaller, opaque and young firms (Clarke et al. 2002; Beck et al.
2004; Berger et al. 2004; Gianetti and Ongena 2012).
The above findings although inconclusive point to a common element: the effect of
foreign banks on access to credit for opaque domestic borrowers largely depends on
the interplay between the information asymmetries they face in the host economy and
the competitive advantages they possess in terms of lending technology that would
enable them to overcome such information asymmetries. Since candidate new firm
entrants are one of the most informationally opaque credit market segments because
of the absence of historical records of their performance (Bulan and Yan 2009; Chavis
et al. 2011), the information asymmetries between them and foreign banks could be
particularly high. This, in combination with the fact that most studies that examine the
effect of foreign bank presence on access to credit are inconclusive and focus on
existing firms, justifies an empirical analysis with regard to the effect of foreign bank
presence on new firm entry.
It is also interesting to investigate the existence of conditioning effects with respect
to the effect of foreign bank presence on entrepreneurship. Claessens and Van Horen
(2014a) show that the effect of foreign banks on private credit depends largely on
host country institutional characteristics. Therefore, we opt to examine for condition-
ing effects of characteristics that relate to the information asymmetry that foreign
banks face in host economies especially in terms of the opaque borrower segments
such as the market for entrepreneurial credit. Such conditioning effects could stem
from the level of credit information sharing and creditor rights in the host economy.
These are institutional arrangements that aim to alleviate the information asymmetry
between creditors and borrowers (Jappelli and Pagano 2002; Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez 2006; Doblas-Madrid and Minetti 2012). Credit information sharing, by
providing historical data on the past behavior of borrowers, could enable loan
screening and thus reduce information asymmetry issues between banks and borrowers
(Kallberg and Udell 2003; Dierkes et al. 2013). Therefore, credit information sharing
could serve as a proxy for the information asymmetry level that foreign banks face in
host economies. Additionally, although information on candidate new firm entrants
does not yet exist in the credit registries, information on their aspiring owners does.
This could enable foreign banks to use the advanced lending technologies, such as
credit scoring models, that they usually employ in order to serve the most opaque
credit market segments, also in the market for entrepreneurial credit (Berger and Udell
2002; Berger and Udell 2006). Creditor rights, by facilitating the use of collateral,
could also reduce information asymmetry by enabling banks to screen borrowers
efficiently (Bester 1985; Berger et al. 2011). This could be useful for foreign banks
in the market of entrepreneurial credit because entrepreneurs could post personal
assets as collateral in order to obtain bank credit (Robb and Robinson 2013). Based
on the above, the second question we attempt to answer in this study is the following:
Do creditor rights and information sharing condition the effect of foreign bank
presence on new firm entry?
We employ a dataset of 83 economies over the 2005–2013 period and find, by
using fixed-effects, dynamic panel, instrumental variables (IV) and panel vector auto
regression (VAR) models, that foreign bank presence exerts a positive and significant
effect on new firm entry. This is in accordance with studies that find that foreign
bank presence could improve the access to credit for opaque domestic borrowers
either directly through the employment of advanced foreign bank lending technologies
(De Haas and Naaborg 2006) or indirectly by incentivising domestic banks to serve
the latter (Gianetti and Ongena 2012).2 Furthermore, we find some evidence that the
positive effect of foreign bank presence on entrepreneurship strengthens in countries
with higher levels of depth of credit information sharing. This could denote that credit
information sharing could empower the lending technologies that foreign banks tend
to rely on when they extend credit to opaque domestic borrowers (Beck et al. 2011;
Beck et al. 2016). We also find that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on
new firm entry subdues at higher levels of creditor rights. This result lends support to
the findings of Bruno and Hauswald (2014) that foreign banks possess an advantage
in debt contract enforcement in countries with weak legal structures.
In further analysis, we find that the positive effect of foreign bank presence subdues at
the presence of a public credit registry, while it strengthens when a private credit bureau
is in place. These results could stem from the fact that these two types of credit registries
differ significantly in the availability of credit information history they contain (OECD
2010; World Bank 2014). Finally, we also provide some evidence that cultural proximity
between the home and host economies strengthens the positive effect of foreign bank
presence on entrepreneurship, while distance in terms of information sharing weakens
this effect. This shows that distance constraints do not operate only through geographic
and cultural factors (Mian 2006), but also through institutional factors that determine the
level of the information asymmetry disadvantage foreign banks face in host economies.
These findings contribute to the literature in three ways. Firstly, we add to the
entrepreneurship determinants literature (e.g. Djankov et al. 2002; Klapper et al. 2015;
Belitski et al. 2016) and specifically to the literature that relates financing conditions
to new firm formation (e.g. Aghion et al. 2007; Havrylchyk 2012). Secondly, we add
2 The analysis in this paper highlights the possible channels through which foreign bank presence could affect
new firm entry. However, the use country-level data (i.e. we do not observe bank-firm relationships) renders
beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate if new firm entrants could benefit directly from foreign bank lending or
indirectly because foreign bank presence could alter the lending policies of domestic banks.
to the literature that examines the effects of foreign banks on the real economy of the
host countries (e.g. De Haas and Van Lelyveld 2006; Gianetti and Ongena 2012;
Bruno and Hauswald 2014). Finally, we also add to the literature that investigates the
effects of creditor rights and information sharing on firm credit (e.g. Brown et al.
2009; Grajzl and Laptieva 2016; Love et al. 2016).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents some theoretical consid-
erations and develops hypotheses, sections 3 and 4 present the data and the methods respec-
tively, section 5 reports and discusses the results, whilst the final section offers some
concluding comments together with some policy implications.
2 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses development
2.1 The effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry
According to the Bhome advantage^ hypothesis of Berger et al. (2000) foreign banks
operate less efficiently than domestic banks because the former face high Bliability of
foreignness^ in a given host economy. An important component of the Bliability of
foreignness^ that foreign banks face is the high level of information asymmetry
between them and domestic borrowers. This could be attributed to two sources. The
first relates to the distance constraints (Mian 2006) that foreign banks face in a given
host country. A foreign bank may be headquartered in a very different market
environment, with a different language, culture and so forth. This renders costly for
foreign banks collecting and processing information on local borrowers. The second
source of information asymmetry between foreign banks and local borrowers relates to
the hierarchical structure of the former. This renders them less able to put an effort in
acquiring Bsoft^ information on local borrowers (Stein 2002; Berger et al. 2005). On
the contrary, foreign banks tend to rely on Bhard^ information on local borrowers.
This Bhard^ information should be credible and publicly verifiable, such as a firm’s
audited financial accounts (Mian 2006; Berger and Black 2011).
It would be rational then to expect that foreign banks will tend to serve the more
transparent domestic firms in the host economy as the theoretical model of
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) predicts. In support of this model, Detragiache
et al. (2008) find that foreign banks, by Bcherry-picking^ the most transparent
domestic borrowers, lead to a decline in aggregate credit which disproportionally
affects opaque domestic borrowers who find themselves in a worse borrower pool
that faces prohibitively high interest rates. In another microeconometric study,
Pennathur and Vishwasrao (2014) find that foreign banks prefer to lend to financially
transparent firms. Similar findings are evident also in other studies (Berger et al.
2001; Berger et al. 2008; Brown et al. 2011).
The above considerations put less transparent domestic borrowers at a disadvantage
in terms of foreign bank financing in comparison with more transparent ones. Poten-
tial new firm entrants in a given credit market could be in an even more disadvan-
taged position from the foreign bank financing standpoint than established (existing)
domestic firms because the latter type of firms could cater foreign banks with more
Bhard^ information in comparison with the former. Thus, foreign bank presence, by
exacerbating the disadvantage of information provision that potential new firm
entrants face vis-à-vis existing firms in the host economy, could inhibit new firm
entry. Based on the above discussion the first hypothesis (H1.A) is the following:
H1.A: Foreign bank presence decreases new firm entry
On the other hand, a higher level of foreign bank presence could promote new firm entry in host
economies. Berger et al. (2000) introduce also the Bglobal advantage^ hypothesis, which posits
that foreign banks possess strong competitive advantages, especially in terms of lending and
information technologies, in comparison with domestic banks. Thus, foreign banks could over-
come the Bliability of foreignness^ in terms of information asymmetry with opaque borrowers.
Berger and Udell (2006) propose a new paradigm of bank financing to opaque
borrowers that involves also foreign bank lending. In their paradigm, foreign banks are
able to provide credit to less transparent clients by employing transactional technologies
that facilitate arms-length financing. An important such technology is the so-called small
business credit scoring. This involves the entry of basic data, also on the personal history
of the firm owner, into models that predict future loan performance. This is particularly
useful for lending to very opaque firms since for such entities, the creditworthiness of the
firm and the owner are closely related (Feldman 1997; Mester 1997). Foreign banks could
also employ asset-based lending and leasing in order to extend credit to opaque borrowers.
In asset-based lending, the bank looks mainly at the underlying assets as the primary
source of repayment while in leasing the leesor (lender) owns an asset and rents it to a
leese (Berger and Udell 2006). In support of this paradigm, several studies find that foreign
banks, by developing such lending technologies, increase lending to opaque domestic
borrowers (Clarke et al. 2005; De Haas and Naaborg 2006; De la Torre et al. 2010).
The paradigm of Berger and Udell (2006) refers to existing firms and not specifically
to potential new entrant firms, but it could also apply to the latter. For example, foreign
banks, in the absence of firm-specific Bhard^ information, could obtain such information
on the aspiring owner of a new firm and employ credit scoring technologies to predict
future loan performance.
This conforms to previous research that finds that banks apply credit scoring models
that use as inputs personal information on the owner in order to finance risky opaque firms
outside their local market (Frame and Woosley 2004; Berger et al. 2005). The use of asset-
based lending by foreign banks could also promote new firm entry. This lending technol-
ogy, according to Berger and Udell (2006), could use as collateral the personal assets of a
firm’s owners and thus is compatible with the findings of Robb and Robinson (2013) that
entrepreneurs obtain start-up bank financing by posting personal assets as collateral.
There is another potential channel through which higher foreign bank presence could
increase new firm entry rates. This is an indirect channel and involves the reaction of
domestic banks to higher levels of foreign bank presence. It could be the case that
incumbent domestic banks would increase credit supply to opaque local borrowers, such
as aspiring new firm entrants, as a reaction to the reduced supply of credit to such
borrowers by foreign banks. Gianetti and Ongena (2012) provide microeconometric
evidence that foreign banks indirectly promote the access to credit for more opaque
borrowers that previously did not have an established bank relationship. This modification
in the behavior of domestic banks is one of the explanations given by Clarke et al.
(2001) to support their findings that higher foreign bank presence improves the financing
conditions of small and less transparent firms. Given that aspiring entrepreneurs form one
of the least transparent segments of the credit market, domestic banks might be more
willing to serve them if they face fierce competition by foreign banks in the transparent
segments of the credit market.
Based on the above discussion we formulate the competing to H1.A hypothesis, H1.B, as
follows:
H1.B: Foreign bank presence increases new firm entry
2.2 The conditioning effects of creditor rights and information sharing
Creditor rights have the potential to decrease the information asymmetry between lenders and
borrowers. In a strong creditor rights environment, banks are able to use collateral require-
ments to differentiate the risk level of the projects of seemingly comparable loan applicants.
This reduction in adverse selection happens through a signaling channel. Candidate borrowers
with lower risk projects, and thus lower risk of loan default, post higher levels of collateral that
candidate borrowers with higher risk projects would not be willing to post (Besanko and
Thakor 1987; Godlewski and Weill 2011). Therefore, strong creditor rights could facilitate the
use of collateral as a singling device for banks and thus increase credit towards entrepreneurs.
Schmalz et al. (2013) provide microeconometric evidence that the use of personal assets as
collateral increases entrepreneurial activity.
The usefulness of collateral in the provision of entrepreneurial credit could be more
important for foreign banks than domestic banks. In the theoretical model of Sengupta
(2007) foreign banks use the signaling nature of collateral in order to compete
successfully with domestic banks. In support of this model, Haselmann et al. (2010)
provide empirical evidence that foreign banks increase their lending considerably more
than domestic banks after legislative changes that facilitate the use of collateral.
Furthermore, some lending technologies, such as asset-based lending, that foreign
banks could use in order to provide finance to opaque domestic borrowers depend
on the use of collateral (Berger and Udell 2006). Therefore, our second hypothesis is
the following:
H2.A: Creditor rights strengthen (moderate) the positive (negative) effect of foreign
bank presence on new firm entry.
However, it could be the case that foreign banks would be more able to promote
new firm entry in a lower creditor rights environment. Empirical evidence from Bruno
and Hauswald (2014) suggests that foreign banks possess an advantage in debt
contract enforcement in an uncertain legal environment. One potential reason could
be the development by foreign banks of lending technologies that do not depend on
creditor rights, as for example advance credit scoring technologies for opaque business
lending (De la Torre et al. 2010). Such lending technologies are based on Bhard^
information mainly on the owner (or on the aspiring owner in the case of new firm
entry) of an opaque firm (Berger and Udell 2006). In this way, foreign banks could
assess the creditworthiness of a potential owner of a new firm without relying on the
signaling channel that strong creditor rights could facilitate. Additionally, some other
lending technologies, such as leasing, that foreign banks could employ in order to
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finance the opaque credit market segment of entrepreneurial credit, do not involve the
transfer of asset ownership to the borrower, thus rendering creditor rights less rele-
vant. Furthermore, in a strong creditor rights environment, there could be a shift in
the composition of foreign bank credit towards mortgage lending. This shift could
render obtaining entrepreneurship credit from foreign banks less probable. In line with
this argument, De Haas et al. (2010) find that when foreign banks perceive collateral
regulation to be of high quality they focus more on mortgage lending. Based on the
above discussion we formulate the competing to H2.A hypothesis as follows:
H2.B: Creditor rights moderate (strengthen) the positive (negative) effect of foreign
bank presence on new firm entry.
Information sharing could reduce the information asymmetry issues that banks face in a
credit market by providing them with information about the past behavior borrowers
(Pagano and Jappelli 1993). Several studies provide empirical evidence (Kallberg and
Udell 2003; Dierkes et al. 2013; Bos et al. 2016) that information sharing reduces adverse
selection and leads to efficient loan screening. A lower level of information asymmetries
due to credit information sharing could lead to a higher level of private sector credit in an
economy (Djankov et al. 2007) especially towards opaque and young firms that cannot
directly provide banks with Bhard^ information such as a lengthy history of audited
financial statement accounts (Brown et al. 2009; Martínez Pería and Singh 2014). Thus,
information sharing could serve as proxy for the level of information asymmetries between
lenders and borrowers in a country especially as far as concerns the opaque credit markets
segments such as the market for entrepreneurial credit.
A lower level of information asymmetries in the credit market could be particularly
important for foreign banks when they extend credit to opaque domestic borrowers because
of the disadvantage of foreign banks in using Bsoft^ borrower information (Gormley 2010). In
line with this, Claessens and Van Horen (2014a) find that foreign banks have a negative effect
on private credit in countries with limited information sharing. Therefore, a high level of
information sharing, by reducing information asymmetries, could alleviate the Bcherry
picking^ behavior of foreign banks and the associated negative effects it could have in the
overall extension of credit especially in the opaque segments of the credit market (Detragiache
et al. 2008). This could also benefit the access to entrepreneurial credit which is one of the least
transparent segments of the credit market.
A mechanism through which the low level of information asymmetries that information
sharing facilitates could benefit the provision of entrepreneurial credit by foreign banks is the
empowerment of the lending technologies they could employ for such type of lending. Firm-
specific information on candidate new firm entrants might not yet exist in the credit registries,
but personal information on aspiring entrepreneurs does. This could enable the use of lending
technologies, such as credit scoring models that foreign banks could use in order to provide
credit to opaque borrowers (De la Torre et al. 2010), also in the market for entrepreneurial
credit (Black and Strahan 2002). This conforms to the fact that credit scoring lending
technologies for opaque firms tend to rely extensively on Bhard^ information on the personal
history of a firm’s owner that banks source from credit bureaus (Berger and Udell 2002; Berger
and Frame 2007; Berger et al. 2011). In line with this argument, Beck et al. (2016) provide
evidence that the sharing of Bhard^ information, such as borrower ratings, through the credit
registry partly eliminates the informational disadvantage of foreign banks when extending
loans to opaque borrowers.
Through another channel, increased information sharing could induce foreign banks to
increase their provision of credit in the host economy because of the disciplinary effect
information sharing have on borrowers (Klein 1992). Information sharing could induce firm
managers to perform well in order to avoid a loan default that would blacklist themselves or
their firm and as a result, they could be excluded from future bank financing (Padilla and
Pagano 1997, 2000). This could also apply in the market for entrepreneurial credit as once
aspiring entrepreneurs obtain credit from foreign banks the information on this transaction
enters the credit information provider.
Based on the above discussion, we formulate our third hypothesis, H3, as follows:
H3: Information sharing strengthens (moderates) the positive (negative) effect of
foreign bank presence on new firm entry.
3 Data and methods
3.1 Data
3.1.1 New firm entry
The dependent variable of our study is new firm entry density (ENT). This is defined as the
number of newly registered companies per 1000 working-age people (ages 15–64) per year.3
We source the data on firm entry density from the World Bank Entrepreneurship Database.
This database comprises a cross-country, time-series panel dataset of the number of newly
formed companies. The dataset is consistent and comparable across heterogeneous legal
regimes and economic systems and has been used widely in the recent literature on the
determinants of new firm entry (Klapper and Love 2011b; Braunerhjelm and Eklund 2014;
Klapper and Love 2014; Klapper et al. 2015; Belitski et al. 2016). For reasons of consistency,
data availability, and relevance to high growth entrepreneurship the dataset focuses on limited
liability firms (Klapper et al. 2010). Furthermore, this legal form of business is the most
prevalent globally (Doing Business 2010). The dataset is available for most economies
globally over the 2004–2014 period with a limited number of missing observations. To
conform to the previous literature (see for example Klapper and Love 2014), we exclude from
our analysis observations from economies that are defined as Boffshore financial centers^ by
the IMF as they might reflect the creation of shell companies and not active firms. Our final
dataset, taking into account the availability of the explanatory variables comprises of 632
observations for 83 countries over the 2005–2013 period. The countries that we include in this
study are available in Table 7 of the appendix.
3 In robustness checks we also use an alternative measure of entrepreneurship: this is the nascent entrepreneur-
ship sourced from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). We have extensively reviewed the literature on
the determinants of new firm entry in a cross-country framework. The new firm entry rate from the World Bank
Entrepreneurship Database together with the GEM measure of entrepreneurship are the most commonly
employed variables in the literature to capture country-level entrepreneurship.
3.1.2 Foreign bank presence
For the foreign bank presence variable, we utilize the bank ownership dataset of Claessens and
van Horen (2014a, 2015). There are three major advantages of this dataset. The first is that it
provides the specific point in time when a foreign bank entered a host economy. This gives a
precise within-country time variation of the foreign bank presence during the period of the
study. The second advantage is that Claessens and van Horen (2014a, 2015) consider also
some other critical issues such as the exit of a foreign bank from the host economy, mergers
and acquisitions and avoidance of double counting. Furthermore, this dataset provides
information on the home economy of each foreign bank. The above advantages render the
Claessens and van Horen (2014a, 2015) dataset the most comprehensive effort to date in terms
of foreign bank presence measurement. In this dataset, a bank is defined as foreign, in
accordance with the banking literature, when 50% or more of the specific bank’s equity is
owned by foreigners. The authors construct two indices of foreign bank presence. The first is
the ratio in each economy of foreign banks over the total number of banks and the second
measure is the ratio of foreign-owned bank assets over the total bank assets. In this study, we
employ the second ratio, (FBAST), because it provides a better measure of the magnitude of
foreign bank presence and is the one that the bank literature employs (Brown et al. 2009; Cull
and Martínez Pería 2013; Bruno and Hauswald 2014).4
3.1.3 Creditor rights, information sharing, and control variables
To account for creditor rights and information sharing at the country level we use the BGetting
Credit^ category of regulations from the BDoing Business^ project of the World Bank. More
specifically, we employ the creditor rights index (CR), which measures the extent to which
bankruptcy and collateral legislation defends the rights of lenders. This index ranges from 0 to
10 with higher values denoting stronger creditor rights protection. To account for information
sharing we use the depth of credit information index (DEPTH). This variable is an indicator for
the richness of information related to the scope, coverage and accessibility of the information
existing in each country’s state-owned credit registry or private credit bureau. The values of
this index range from 0 to 6 for each economy and higher values represent higher levels of
informational depth. Both of these indices are widely used in the banking literature (Houston
et al. 2010; Claessens and Van Horen 2012; Bruno and Hauswald 2014).
The control variables are drawn from the literature on the determinants of firm entry (Da
Rin et al. 2011; Klapper and Love 2011b; Bruno et al. 2013; Dreher and Gassebner 2013;
Klapper and Love 2014). Firstly, we control for macroeconomic conditions. Thus, in our
models, we include GDP growth (GDPgr) to account for economic growth dynamics and
business cycles effects (Klapper et al. 2015). We also employ the natural logarithm of GDP per
capita in real terms (lnGDPcap) in order to control for the general level of economic
development (Bruno et al. 2013; Dreher and Gassebner 2013). Additionally, we use the ratio
4 The first ratio, the number of foreign banks divided by the total number of banks in a country, may provide a
better measure of foreign bank presence in terms of entry. The two ratios of foreign bank presence are highly
correlated (correlation stands at around 0.8, see Table 8 in appendix) and estimations using either of these two
ratios of foreign bank presence produce qualitatively similar results. Therefore, in our main analysis we present
the results using the ratio of foreign banks assets over total bank assets (FBAST) as a measure of foreign bank
presence. In the robustness checks section of this paper we also present results using the ratio of the number of
foreign banks over total banks (FBNUM).
of private sector credit to GDP (PSC) to control for the level of financial development (Klapper
et al. 2006; Dreher and Gassebner 2013). Finally, we account for the value added from
agriculture as a percentage of GDP (AGRIC) as an alternative proxy for development
(Dreher and Gassebner 2013). We source these variables from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank.
The second set of control variables are proxies of the regulatory conditions in the host
economy. To this end, we use several regulatory variables, relevant for new firm entry, from
the Bindex of economic freedom^ of the Heritage Foundation. The various fields of this index
range from 0 to 100 with higher values denoting less regulatory burden. In particular, we use
the business freedom index (BUSFREE), which measures the ability to start, operate and close
a business in an economy. We expect that new firm entry will have a positive association with
less regulatory hurdles in establishing a new firm (Klapper et al. 2006; Klapper and Love
2011b). We also use the fiscal freedom index (FISCFREE), which is a measure of the tax
burden that the government imposes on the firms and individuals in a given country.
Theoretical models (Cullen and Gordon 2007) and empirical evidence (Demirguç-Kunt et al.
2006; Da Rin et al. 2011) suggest that higher taxation deters firm entry.
The government freedom index (GOVFREE) is also included in our models. This index
reflects the level of government expenditures (including consumption and transfers) as a ratio
of GDP. The inclusion of this variable follows the analysis of Aidis et al. (2012) who find that
the entrepreneurship rates are inversely related to the size of the government. Additionally, to
control for government imposed frictions in the financial industry we use the financial freedom
(FINFREE) component of the Bindex of economic freedom^. The inclusion of this index in the
analysis is important in order to ensure that the foreign presence variable does not merely
reflect privatisation.
Furthermore, we employ the overall regulatory quality index (REGWB) from the World
Bank Governance Indicators to account for the ability of governments to design and imple-
ment regulation beneficial to private sector development. This regulatory quality index is a
composite index that takes into account regulatory quality in all areas of the economy. It ranges
from −2.5 to 2.5, with higher values denoting a better regulatory framework. The use of this
index eases omitted variable concerns with regards to types of regulation other than ones that
we specifically include in the models. Moreover, in order to ensure that the foreign bank
presence variable in our analysis does not capture an effect related to general inward FDI
(Kouretas and Tsoumas 2016) we include in our models as control variable the ratio of FDI
inflows to GDP (INFDI). We source this variable from the World Development Indicators
(WDI) database of the World Bank. Finally, in order to control for the level of competition in
the banking industry in each economy, we use the concentration ratio as measured by the
assets of the three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banking assets (C3).
The inclusion of this control variable is important because the competitive conditions in the
banking industry could affect new firm entry (Cetorelli and Strahan 2006). We source the C3
variable from the Global Financial Development Database of the World Bank.5 In Tables 1
and 2 we provide the detailed definition of the variables that we include in this study and some
descriptive statistics.
5 In alternative estimations we use as a measure of competition in the banking industry the Lerner index at the
country level. The Lerner index is also available in the Global Financial Development Database of the World
Bank but is available for fewer years than the C3 ratio. Thus, we report the estimations that employ the C3 ratio
as a measure of bank competition. The results are qualitatively similar when we employ the Lerner index as a
measure of competition.
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3.2 Methods
We provide results from both fixed effects and dynamic panel specifications. The fixed effect
estimator takes the following form:
lnENTð Þi;t ¼ a0 þ β1∑nj¼1 Controlð Þi;t þ β2 lnFBASTð Þi;t þ β3 CRi;t
 þ β4 DEPTHi;t
 þ vi þ mt þ ui;t
h i
;
ð1Þ
where (lnENT)i, t is the natural logarithm of the new firm entry measure observed in country i at
time t, lnFBAST is the natural logarithm of the measure of foreign bank presence, CR is the
creditor rights index, DEPTH is the information sharing index, Control is a vector of control
variables, v are country fixed effects,m are time effects and u is the stochastic term. By employing
country fixed effects we capture unobserved country heterogeneity. That is we account for all the
time-invariant characteristics of the countries we include in our sample and could affect new firm
entry rates (e.g. geographic position, culture etc.). By employing time effects we also account for
shocks common to all countries, which is important in this study which encompass the years of
the recent financial crisis. We perform the fixed effects estimations with robust standard errors.
There are two important concerns with the above identification strategy. The first is the
potential persistence of entrepreneurship rates (Dutta and Sobel 2016). The second is the
potential endogeneity between the new firm entry rate (lnENT) and the foreign bank presence
(lnFBAST) variable. It could be the case that foreign banks may find attractive to enter
economies with high entrepreneurship rate (Havrylchyk 2012). For these two reasons, we
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm Entry Density (ENT) 691 3.337 4.139 0 32.6
Foreign Ownership of Banks in terms of assets (FBAST) 673 44.521 33.815 1 100
Foreign Ownership of Banks in terms of numbers (FBNUM) 682 44.698 26.722 1 100
Creditor Rights (CR) 691 5.999 2.414 0 10
Depth of Credit Information (DEPTH) 691 3.318 2.321 0 6
GDP per capita (GDPcap) 682 21,586 18,242 575 96,711
GDP growth 691 3.479 4.139 −14.814 17.291
Private sector credit (PSC) 632 68.559 52.567 0.010 227.527
Agriculture value added as% of GDP (AGRIC) 679 9.439 9.549 0.034 43.206
Bank industry concentration ratio (C3) 661 71.495 19.830 21.695 100
Financial Freedom (FINFREE) 676 59.201 18.150 10 90
Business Freedom (BUSFREE) 676 72.532 14.303 28.8 100
Fiscal Freedom (FISCFREE) 676 73.899 13.744 32.7 99.9
Government Freedom (GOVFREE) 674 61.089 22.869 2.2 96.1
Regulatory Quality (REGWB) 682 0.491 0.857 −1.638 1.971
FDI inflows (INFDI) 682 5.863 9.988 −58.978 142.257
Rule of law (RLWB) 682 0.337 0.974 −1.653 2.000
Public credit registry dummy (PBDUM) 691 0.499 0.500 0 1
Private credit bureau dummy (PVDUM) 691 0.654 0.476 0 1
Nascent entrepreneurship rate (NASCENT) 392 5.838 4.647 0.89 31.3
Distance in terms of creditor rights (DISCR) 663 1.145 3.095 −10 8.3
Distance in terms of information sharing (DISEPTH) 663 −0.409 2.421 −6 6
Proximity in terms of culture (PROXCULT) 669 0.404 0.529 0 2
Geographic distance in ln (DISGEO) 670 8.193 1.007 5.683 9.721
Foreign bank regulatory restrictions (RESFB) 619 0.168 0.374 0 1
Foreign bank denied applications ratio (DENFB) 623 0.050 0.155 0 1
opt to estimate also dynamic models using the two-step system generalized method of
moments estimator (GMM) as advanced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998), using corrected robust standard errors (Windmeijer 2005).
The two-step system GMMmodels include among the rest of the explanatory variables, one
lag of the new firm entry rate variable (lnENT), and therefore, eq. (1) takes the following form:
lnENTð Þi;t ¼ a0 þ β1 lnENTð Þi;t−1 þ β2∑nj¼1 Controlð Þi;t þ β3 lnFBASTð Þi;t þ β4 CRi;t
 þ β5 DEPTHi;t
 þ vi þ mt þ ui;t
h i
ð2Þ
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a further explanatory variable in the
model (2) accounts for the potential persistence of the new firm entry rate (lnENT). Another
virtue of the two-step system GMM estimator is that we can treat some of the explanatory
variables as endogenous with the use of appropriate instruments. In our estimations we treat as
endogenous the lagged dependent variable ((lnENT)i, t − 1) as it is the standard in the literature,
the foreign bank presence variable (lnFBAST) and the business freedom (BUSFREE) vari-
able.6 This suggests that we use the second lag of the dependent variable, of the foreign bank
presence variable and of the business freedom variable as instruments (Blundell and Bond
1998; Bond 2002). The results of the two-step system GMM estimator are also verified by
Hansen’s J test for instrument validity and the second-order autocorrelation of the error terms
test, AR2, as introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991).
4 Empirical findings and discussion
4.1 Main analysis
Table 3 shows the estimations of the determinants of new firm entry for the 2005–2013 period.
The first model of Table 3 shows the baseline fixed effects results, while in the rest of the fixed
effects models (2 to 4) we interact the foreign bank presence variable (lnFBAST) with the
creditor rights (CR) and the information sharing (DEPTH) variables.
The results of the baseline model 1 in Table 3 show that the foreign bank presence
(lnFBAST) exerts a significant at the 5% level positive effect on new firm entry. This result
provides evidence in support of hypothesis H1.B that foreign bank presence increases new firm
entry.
This result conforms with the literature that posits that foreign banks, by employing
advanced lending technologies, could overcome the informational disadvantages that they
face in the credit markets of the host economies and thus be able to facilitate lending to opaque
borrowers (Clarke et al. 2005; De Haas and Naaborg 2006; Bruno and Hauswald 2014) such as
aspiring entrepreneurs. Through another channel, foreign bank presence could have a positive
effect on new firm entry indirectly by motivating domestic banks to increase their credit supply
6 Initially, we attempted to employ as endogenous variables just the lagged dependent variable (lnENTt-1) and the
foreign bank presence variable (lnFBAST). In this case we obtain significant p-values for the Hansen J test. We
find that by treating the lagged dependent variable (lnENTt-1), the foreign bank presence variable (lnFBAST) and
the business freedom (BUSFREE) variable as endogenous we obtain insignificant p-values for the Hansen J test.
This suggests that the instruments are acceptable and the business freedom (BUSFREE) variable is better
modelled as endogenous in the dynamic panel models. This also makes sense from a theoretical standpoint.
The business freedom (BUSFREE) is a measure of regulation of firm entry and therefore it is rational to consider
it as endogenous to the entrepreneurship rate.
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to less transparent clients (Clarke et al. 2001). There is empirical evidence showing that foreign
banks tend to focus mostly on large and more transparent borrowers (Detragiache et al. 2008;
Brown et al. 2011; Pennathur and Vishwasrao 2014). However, a potentialBcherry-picking^
behaviour of foreign banks does need to necessarily lead to a decline in credit towards opaque
borrowers, as in Detragiache et al. (2008), but could rather indirectly improve their access to
credit for the latter as the findings of Gianetti and Ongena (2012) demonstrate.
The models that include the interaction terms between foreign bank presence (lnFBAST)
and the creditor rights (CR) and information sharing (DEPTH) variables reveal some interesting
findings. In model 2 of Table 4 the interaction between foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) and
creditor rights (CR) has a negative and significant at the 5% level effect on new firm entry while
the individual effect of foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) on new firm entry is positive and
significant at the 1% level. In support of hypothesis H2.B, the positive effect of foreign bank
presence on new firm entry subdues at higher levels of creditor rights. This implies that foreign
bank presence is particularly useful for entrepreneurship in countries with poor legal infrastruc-
ture in terms of creditor rights. This result conforms to the findings of Bruno and Hauswald
(2014) that foreign banks could substitute for insufficient legal infrastructure in host economies.
A reason for this could be the development by foreign banks of advanced lending technologies
to overcome legal uncertainty in host economies such as credit scoring technologies or leasing
(Berger and Udell 2006; De la Torre et al. 2010; Beck et al. 2016) and therefore be able to lend
to the opaque segments of the credit market such as the market for entrepreneurial credit.
Another potential channel through which the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new
firm entry could subdue at higher levels of creditor rights could be the shift of foreign bank
lending towards mortgages that are the typical form of collateralised lending (De Haas et al.
2010). In model 3 of Table 3 we interact the foreign bank presence variable (lnFBAST) with the
information sharing variable (DEPTH) and find that this interaction term has a positive but not
statistically significant coefficient while the individual of the lnFBAST is positive and signif-
icant at the 5% level. This provides some tentative empirical evidence in support of hypothesis
H.3 that information sharing could strengthen the positive effect of foreign bank presence on
new firm entry. In model 4 of Table 3 we include the interaction term between foreign bank
presence and creditor rights and the interaction term between foreign bank presence and
information sharing in the same model and the results we obtain are similar.
In models 5 to 8 of Table 3 we provide the results of the dynamic panel estimations. The results
of the baseline dynamic panel model 5 in Table 3 reveal that the lag of the dependent variable, the
natural log of the new firm entry rate (lnENT), has a positive and significant at the 1% level
coefficient. Furthermore, its large magnitude (0.897) denotes a high persistency of the new firm
entry rate. This finding justifies the use of dynamic panel analysis in this study. With regards to the
effect of foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) on new firm entry we find that it is positive and
statistically significant at the 5% level lending support to the empirical findings of the fixed effects
models. In models 6 to 8 of Table 3 we include the interaction terms of foreign bank presence
(lnFBAST) with creditor rights (CR) and information sharing (DEPTH).7 In model 6 of Table 3 we
find that the interaction between foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) and creditor rights (CR) is
negative and significant at the 1% level while the individual effect of foreign bank presence
(lnFBAST) on new firm entry is positive and significant at the 1% level. This provides further
7 Note that since in the dynamic panel analysis we treat foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) as endogenous, we
also treat as endogenous the interaction terms of this variable with creditor rights (CR) and information sharing
(DEPTH) (Asiedu and Lien 2011).
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support to the results of the fixed effects models that foreign banks could particularly promote
entrepreneurship in uncertain legal environments. In model 7 of Table 3 we find, similarly to the
fixed effects estimations, that the interaction between foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) and
information sharing (DEPTH) is positive but not statistically different from zero. However, in
model 8 of Table 3, when we include all the interaction terms in the same dynamic panel
specification, we find a positive and statistically significant at the 5% level coefficient for the
lnFBAST*DEPTH interaction. This result provides some evidence that the positive effect of foreign
bank presence on new firm entry strengthens at higher levels of credit information sharing in
accordance with hypothesisH.3. Foreign banks seem to benefit new firm entry disproportionally in
host economies in which they face a lower level of information asymmetries as proxied by credit
information sharing. Therefore, credit information sharing could alleviate the negative effects of a
potential foreign bank Bcherry-picking^ behaviour on the credit provision to opaque credit market
segments, such as the market for entrepreneurial credit, as the findings of Detragiache et al. (2008)
would suggest. One of the reasons could be that information sharing could empower the lending
technologies that foreign banks employ to provide credit to opaque domestic borrowers. For
example, personal information on the past borrowing behaviour of an aspiring entrepreneur, sourced
from credit bureaus or registries, could be employed as input in the credit scoring models that
foreign banks could use in the market for entrepreneurial credit (Berger and Udell 2002; Black and
Strahan 2002; Berger andUdell 2006). Furthermore, higher levels of information sharing in the host
economy could induce foreign banks to extend credit to more opaque borrowers, such as potential
new firm entrants, because of the disciplinary effect information sharing could have on the latter
(Klein 1992).
In order to enhance our analysis with regards to the conditioning effects stemming from the
interaction between foreign bank presence and creditor rights we provide estimations using an
alternative measure of creditor rights. More specifically, instead of interacting foreign bank
presence with the creditor rights (CR) index, we interact it with a measure of rule of law
(RLWB) in the host economies. We source the rule of law (RLWB) variable from the World
Governance Indicators of the World Bank, and it measures the degree of the contract
enforcement, property rights and court efficiency. These results are available in models 9
and 10 of Table 3. We provide estimations from both fixed-effects (model 9 of Table 3) and
dynamic panel specifications (model 10 of Table 3). The results we obtain from these models
are consistent with the results we obtained from the rest of the models in Table 3 and provide
further evidence in support of the hypothesis H2.B. More specifically we find that in the
models 9 and 10 of Table 3 the interaction term between foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) and
the rule of law (RLWB) is negative and significant. This result lends further support to the
previous findings that the beneficial effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry subdues
when contract enforcement regulation improves in line with Bruno and Hauswald (2014).
With regards to the individual effects of creditor rights and information sharing we find, in
most models of Table 3, that they have a positive association with new firm entry. This positive
association of creditor rights (CR) and information sharing (DEPTH) with new firm entry is
statistically significant in most models for the former variable. This finding underscores the
importance of collateral in obtaining bank credit for entrepreneurial activities in line with the
findings of Robb and Robinson (2013). Furthermore, this result provides further evidence that
personal collateral from the aspiring entrepreneurs must often be posted to secure financing for
new firm entry (Avery et al. 1998; Moon 2009).
Finally, in terms of the control variables we find in most specifications of Table 3 that new
firm entry has a positive association with GDP growth and economic development
(lnGDPcap) in line with the findings of Bruno et al. (2013) and Klapper et al. (2015).
Additionally, business freedom (BUSFREE) has a positive and significant association with
new firm entry in most specifications. This result highlights the importance of less stringent
regulation of entry in facilitating entrepreneurship in line with the findings of Klapper et al.
(2006). We also find that concentration ratio in the banking industry (C3) has a negative and, in
some specifications, statistically significant association with new firm entry. This result is in
line with the study of Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) who find that potential new firm entrants
face greater difficulty in obtaining credit in less competitive bank markets. Furthermore, we
find that limited government size (GOVFREE) has a positive and significant association with
new firm entry in line with Aidis et al. (2012).
4.2 Further analysis
4.2.1 Conditional effects of different types of information sharing providers (Private
Credit Bureaus Vs Public Credit Registries)
So far the analysis provides evidence that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new
firm entry strengthens at higher levels of depth of credit information sharing. In this section we
go one step further and examine for conditioning effects with regards to the distinction of
information sharing providers between public credit registries and private credit bureaus. This
distinction is important as these two types of credit information providers can differ
significantly in the availability of credit history and the associated information they might
contain. OECD (2010) reports that private credit bureaus have some distinct advantages over
public credit registries. Public credit registries collect information mainly on large borrowers,
they are subject to stricter privacy laws and they usually do not provide additional services
such as borrower credit ratings. Additionally, recent empirical evidence casts doubt on the
reliability of the credit information available in the public credit registries (Giannetti et al.
2016). Furthermore, some microeconometric studies find that it is the introduction of private
credit bureaus, and not the introduction of public credit registries, that benefit the access to
bank credit for opaque borrowers (Love and Mylenko 2003; Martínez Pería and Singh 2014;
Grajzl and Laptieva 2016). It could be the case therefore that private credit bureaus are more
able than public registries to decrease the information asymmetries that foreign banks face in
host economies especially as far as concerns the opaque credit market segments such as the
one for entrepreneurial credit. In line with this argument, empirical evidence from Tsai et al.
(2011) suggests that the presence of private credit bureaus is an important factor that foreign
banks take into account when they decide where to locate internationally.
Based on the above discussion we formulate the following hypothesis (H4):
H4: The presence of a private credit bureau would be more beneficial than the
presence of a public credit registry in terms of the effect of foreign bank presence on
new firm entry
To proceed to this type of analysis we follow an approach similar to Tsai et al. (2011) and
construct two dummy variables that would indicate the presence of a) a public credit registry
(PBDUM) and b) a private credit bureau (PVDUM). Therefore, we employ the public credit
registry and private credit bureau coverage indices of the Doing Business dataset of the World
Bank. More specifically, if a country at a specific year has a 0% population and firm coverage
through a public registry we assume the absence of a public credit registry. In a similar manner,
we construct the dummy variable for the presence of a private credit bureau. The models that
include the interaction terms between foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) and the public credit
registry (PBDUM) and private credit bureau (PVDUM) dummies are available in Table 4
(models 1–4). We provide results from the dynamic panel specifications as we obtain similar
results with the fixed effects estimator.
The empirical findings provide evidence in support of hypothesis H4. In models 1 and 3 of
Table 4 we find that the interaction term between the presence of a private credit bureau and
foreign bank presence (lnFBAST*PVDUM) enters with a positive coefficient, which is statis-
tically significant at the 5% level only in the former model. In model 4 we drop from the
specification the depth of information sharing variable (DEPTH). This variable (DEPTH)
reflects the richness of information sharing either from a private credit bureau or a public
credit registry. Since private credit bureaus usually provide much richer information on
borrowers than public credit registries, the inclusion of the DEPTH variable in the models
could absorb explanatory power from the private credit bureau dummy.8 Indeed, in model 4 we
find that the interaction between foreign bank presence and the private credit bureau dummy is
positive and significant at the 10% level. These results provide evidence that the positive effect
of foreign bank presence on new firm entry strengthens in the presence of a private credit
bureau. The existence of a private credit bureau, which contains also information on small
borrowers and provides credit rating information (OECD 2010; World Bank 2014), could be of
importance for foreign banks in extending credit to the opaque credit market segments such as
the one of entrepreneurial credit. This could be because Bhard^ information availability on small
borrowers could decrease the information asymmetry between them and foreign banks by
empowering the use of transaction-based lending technologies, such as credit scoring models,
that the latter tend to rely on. It is also worth noting that in most specifications the individual
effect of the private credit bureau dummy (PVDUM) has a positive and statistically significant
association with new firm entry. This denotes that private credit bureaus could enhance credit
availability to entrepreneurial activities also through the domestic banking sector. This is
consistent with the recent empirical evidence from Martínez Pería and Singh (2014).
With regards to thepublic credit registry dummy(PBDUM)we find inmodels 2, 3 and4ofTable4 that
its interaction with foreign bank presence (lnFBAST*PBDUM) is negative and significant at the 5% level.
Thus, the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry subdues in the presence of a public
credit registry. Public credit registries report informationmostly on large firmswith high credit exposure and
large firms are a segment of the market favored by foreign banks (Pennathur and Vishwasrao 2014).
Therefore information on these firmsmight induce foreign banks to gear lending towards this type of firms
and less on themoreopaque segments of the creditmarket suchas themarket for entrepreneurial credit.This
would be consistent with the findings of Detragiache et al. (2008).
4.2.2 Conditional Effects of Distance Constraints between Home and Host Economies
We further examine if distance constraints between the home and the host countries condition the
effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry. Distance constraints between a bank’s
8 The correlation (see Table 8 in the appendix) between the depth of information sharing (DEPTH) and the
presence of private credit bureau dummy (PVDUM) is around 0.7, while it is only 0.066 with the public credit
registry dummy (PBDUM). This provides evidence that private credit bureaus are the main source of the depth of
information sharing in a given country.
headquarter and loan officers renders harder the reliance on Bsoft^ information on local borrowers
and therefore exacerbates information asymmetries (Stein 2002; Liberti and Mian 2009). There-
fore, geographic and cultural distance constraints could induce foreign banks to focus mostly on
large and transparent borrowers in the host economy (Beck et al. 2016) and shy away from the
least transparent credit markets segments such as the one for entrepreneurial credit. In line with
this, Mian (2006) provides empirical evidence that geographic and cultural distance between
foreign banks’ headquarters and branches in the host economy induces them to avoid lending to
informationally opaque borrowers. In another study Berger et al. (2001) find that distant foreign
banks face more hurdles to lend to less transparent borrowers in Argentina. However, it is not
only geographic and cultural distance that could matter but also institutional distance. Ongena
et al. (2013) show that home country institutional characteristics define the business model that
foreign banks tend to export in the host economies and this affects their lending activities in the
latter. It could be easier for a foreign bank to apply its business model and its advanced lending
technologies in a familiar institutional environment in the host economy (Claessens and Van
Horen 2014b). Based on the above discussion we formulate the following hypothesis (H5):
H5: Geographic, cultural and institutional distance constraints (proximity) could
negatively (positively) condition the effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry
To test this hypothesis we interact variables that reflect geographic distance, cultural
proximity and institutional distance in terms of creditor rights and credit information sharing
with the foreign bank presence variable. To construct the distance and proximity variables we
follow an approach similar to Delis et al. (2016). To this end, we calculate the weighted distance
(proximity) between the multiple home countries related with the foreign banks present in each
host economy with the host economy. More specifically, we first calculate the distance
(proximity) between each foreign country and a host economy for a given characteristic and
then estimate a weighted average. We use as weights the ratio of each foreign country’s bank
assets over the total foreign bank assets in each host economy. Therefore, the weighted distance
variables are equal to the sum of the multiplication outcomes of these weights with the distance
(proximity) of each considered variable between multiple foreign home countries and each host
economy. We construct three distance variables that reflect geographic distance (DISGEO) and
institutional distance in terms of creditor rights (DISCR) and depth of credit information sharing
(DISDEPTH). We also construct a cultural proximity variable, (PROXCULT), which ranges
between 0 and 2. Cultural proximity could take maximum value of 2 when there is a colonial
link (value of 1) and the same official language (value of 1), while 0 otherwise.9
The results of the specifications that include the interaction terms of these distance (proximity)
variables with foreign bank presence are available in Table 4 (see models 5 to 9). We provide
estimations from the dynamic panel models as we obtain similar results with the fixed effects
estimator. The findings lend some support to hypothesis H5. The interaction term between
cultural proximity (PROXCULT) and foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) enters model 6 of
Table 4 with a positive and significant at the 10% level coefficient. Thus, the positive effect of
9 We source the data to construct the cultural proximity and geographic distance variables from CEPII. www.
cepii.fr. Note that the cultural proximity and geographic distance variables we construct are time variant. The
geographic distance and cultural proximity between two given countries is time invariant but the weights that we
multiply these characteristics with (i.e. the share of each home country’s foreign bank assets over the total foreign
bank assets in a given host economy) to construct the distance and proximity variables in this study are time
variant.
foreign bank presence on new firm entry strengthens at higher levels of cultural proximity
between the home countries of foreign banks and the host economy. In model 8 of Table 4 we
also find that the interaction term between distance in terms of credit information sharing
(DISDEPTH) and foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) is negative and significant at the 1% level.10
Thus the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry weakens at higher levels of
institutional distance in terms of information sharing between the home countries of foreign banks
and a given host economy. This result underscores the importance of credit information sharing in
reducing the information asymmetries that foreign banks face in a host economy in order to be
able to lend to opaque borrowers such as aspiring entrepreneurs. Foreign banks that originate
from countries with a high level of depth of credit information sharing could have developed
lending technologies, such as credit scoring, in order to extend credit to opaque borrowers that
could be highly dependent on inputs from credit bureaus or registries. Therefore their capacity to
apply such lending technologies in a host economy to lend to opaque credit market segments,
such as the one for entrepreneurial credit, would depend on credit information sharing availability.
It is also worth noting that in model 9 of Table 4 only the interaction term between distance in
terms of credit information sharing and foreign bank presence (DISDEPTH*lnFBAST) retains its
statistical significance.11 The latter finding highlights the importance of institutional in addition to
geographic or cultural distance constraints (Mian 2006) in terms of the effect that foreign banks
could have on the access to credit for opaque borrowers in the host economies.
4.3 Robustness checks
4.3.1 IV estimations with alternative foreign bank presence variable and alternative
dependent variable
Another way, other than the use of a dynamic panel specification, to overcome the potential
endogeneity between entrepreneurship and foreign bank presence is to employ an instrumental
variable (IV) technique such as a two stage least square (2SLS) estimation. To this end, we
need one or more instrumental variables that satisfy the exclusion restriction; that is, we need
to identify one or more variables that affect foreign bank presence but do not affect entrepre-
neurship directly. It is evident in the literature (Detragiache et al. 2008; Giannetti and Ongena
2009; Gianetti and Ongena 2012; Delis et al. 2016) that foreign bank regulatory restrictions are
a valid instrument for foreign bank presence. The empirical evidence suggests that the
10 In unreported estimations we also run model 8 of Table 4 with the inclusion of a distance measure in terms of
the level of economic development (lnGDPcap) and its interaction with the foreign bank presence variable. Our
results are robust to this exercise. This is to ensure that the significant and negative effect of the interaction term
between distance in terms of depth of credit information sharing (DISDEPTH) and foreign bank presence
(lnFBAST) does not reflect differences between the home and host economies in terms of the level of economic
development.
11 Note that in model 9 of Table 4 we have instrument proliferation because we include all the interaction terms
of the distance and proximity variables with the foreign bank presence variable in the same specification, and we
have modelled these interactions as endogenous. Since the foreign bank presence variable is endogenous, its
interaction term with other variables is also endogenous (Asiedu and Lien 2011), and this is the approach we have
adopted in this paper. Roodman (2009) suggests that in dynamic panel models the ratio between instruments and
cross-sections (i.e. countries in our case) should be smaller than unity. Model 9 of Table 4 is the only dynamic
panel model in this study that the value of this ratio is higher than unity. Therefore, we have estimated again
model 9 of Table 4 with the difference GMM estimator, which uses a lower number of instruments, rather than
the system GMM estimator and we obtain qualitatively similar results. These estimations are available upon
request.
deregulation process in the banking sector exerts a positive effect on the expansion of foreign
banks (Claessens and Van Horen 2014b). Furthermore, it is unlikely that regulatory restrictions
for foreign banks would have a direct effect on entrepreneurship.
Thus, we employ two instrumental variables that reflect foreign bank regulatory restrictions in
the host economy. The first one, a de jure measure of foreign bank regulatory restrictions, is a
dummy variable (RESFB) that takes the value of 1 if foreign bank presence is restricted and 0
otherwise. To construct this variable we follow an approach similar to Claessens and Van Horen
(2014b), whereby foreign bank presence is constrained in case foreign bank ownership is limited to
less than 50% and/or when subsidiaries or branches are not permitted to open. The second
instrumental variable, a de facto measure of foreign bank regulatory restrictions, is the proportion
of the applications received from foreign bank entities that have been denied by the regulators in
the host economy (DENFB). Data for both these instrumental variables are obtained from the 2006
and 2011 bank regulation surveys and their accompanied papers of Barth et al. (2008, 2013).12
We provide estimations from 2SLS models with fixed effects and robust standard errors that
employ the above instruments in Table 5.13 In these models we employ an alternative foreign
bank presence variable; the natural logarithm of the percentage ratio of the number of foreign
banks over the total number of banks in a host economy (lnFBNUM). This variable better reflects
foreign bank entry in comparison with the asset-based foreign bank presence variable (lnFBAST)
we used in themain analysis. Furthermore, in models 1 to 4 of Table 5 we use the same dependent
variable (lnENT) that we have employed in our main analysis. However, in models 5 to 8 of
Table 5 we employ an alternative dependent variable to proxy for entrepreneurship. More
specifically, we use country data on nascent entrepreneurship that we source from the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). In this database, nascent entrepreneurship at the country level
is measured as the number of people that are actively involved in starting a new business, as a
percentage of the adult population. This measure of entrepreneurship has been employed in
several studies of the determinants of new firm entry (e.g. Wennekers et al. 2005; Baliamoune-
Lutz and Garello 2014).14 We employ the natural logarithm of this measure (lnNascent).
The first stage results from the 2SLS IV models in Table 5 indicate that the two instru-
mental variables (RESFB and DENFD) have a negative and significant at the 1% level effect
on the foreign bank presence variable (see lower part of Table 5) while they do not exert a
significant direct effect on our entrepreneurship measures (see Table 9 in the appendix).
Furthermore, in all models of Table 5 the validity of the instruments is demonstrated by the
under-identification LM test (UIT), the weak identification Wald F-Test (WIT)15 and the over-
identification test of Hansen (OIT).
The second stage results of the models in Table 5 provide empirical support to our previous
findings. In most models of Table 5 the alternative foreign bank presence variable (lnFBNUM)
12 We assign the regulatory data following the literature (Houston et al. 2010; Fratzscher et al. 2016). Specifically,
we assign values from the 2006 survey to the period 2004–2007 and the data employed between 2008 and 2013
are sourced from the 2011 survey.
13 Note that in the models of Table 5 that include interaction terms between the foreign bank presence variable
(lnFBNUM) and other country characteristics, following Giannetti and Ongena (2009), we also instrument these
interaction terms with the interactions between the instrumental variables RESFB and DENFB with the
corresponding country characteristics. This procedure is important because the interaction between an endoge-
nous variable and another variable is also endogenous (Asiedu and Lien 2011). However, not instrumenting for
the interaction terms does not yield significant changes in our results.
14 The GEM database has less coverage in terms of countries in comparison with theWorld Bank Entrepreneur-
ship Database.
15 We obtain critical values for the WIT from Stock and Yogo (2005).
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exerts a positive and significant at the 5% level effect on the two entrepreneurship variables (see
models 1–8 in Table 5). This lends further support to hypothesisH1.B that foreign bank presence
would have a positive effect on new firm entry. Additionally, in further support of hypothesis
H2.B, the interaction term between foreign bank presence and creditor rights (lnFBNUM*CR) is
negative and exerts significant at the 5% level effect on the two measures of entrepreneurship we
employ (see models 2 and 6 of Table 5). Some support of hypothesisH3 that information sharing
would strengthen the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry is also evident.
The interaction term between foreign bank presence (lnFBNUM) and depth of credit information
sharing (DEPTH) is positive and significant at the 10% level in model 2 of Table 5 when the
dependent variable is the World Bank measure of entrepreneurship (lnENT). However, it is
positive and not significantly different from zero when the dependent variable is the nascent
entrepreneurship (lnNascent) measure from GEM (see model 6 of Table 5). We also find further
evidence that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on entrepreneurship weakens in the
presence of public credit registries. In model 3 and model 7 of Table 5 the interaction term
between foreign bank presence and the public credit registry dummy (lnFBNUM*PBDUM) is
negative and significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively. The latter finding lends additional
support to hypothesis H4 that private credit bureaus would be more beneficial than public credit
registries in terms of the effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry. Finally, we find some
further evidence that the distance in terms of depth of credit information sharing between the
home and host economy (DISDEPTH) weakens the positive effect of foreign bank presence
(lnFBNUM) on new firm entry. The interaction term lnFBNUM*DISDEPTH is negative and
significant at the 5% level in model 4 of Table 5 but negative and not significant in model 8 of
Table 5 when we use the alternative measure of entrepreneurship (lnNascent) as the dependent
variable. The latter finding lends some weak support to hypothesisH5 that distance effects would
moderate the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry.16
4.3.2 Panel VAR estimations
As a final robustness check, we follow Love and Zicchino (2006) and opt for the flexible
framework of a panel VAR specification that includes the new firm entry rate variable (lnENT)
and the foreign bank presence variable (lnFBAST). In a panel VAR framework, all variables
are assumed to be endogenous and in this way we can take into account reverse causality
issues. Furthermore, the panel VAR analysis allows us to observe the isolated impact of foreign
bank presence on new firm entry rate as well as its intertemporal effects. Specifically, we focus
on orthogonalized impulse-response functions (IRFs), which show the response of the variable
of interest (new firm entry) to an orthogonal shock in another variable of interest (foreign bank
presence).17 By orthogonalizing the response we are able to identify the effect of one shock at
a time, while holding other shocks constant. We present the IRFs results in graphical form in
Fig. 1. The second graph of the first row shows the response of new firm entry (lnENT) on a
16 We have also estimated 2SLS IVmodels that include the interaction terms between foreign banks presence and
the other distance (proximity) variables (geographic distance, cultural proximity and creditor rights distance), but
we did not find statistically significant effects.
17 As a first step in the panel VAR estimation we follow Lütkepohl (2006) and assume the optimal order of lags
for the right-hand side variables of the system of equations. We compute for the first, second and third lag the
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. We confirm with the results of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and with
the results of the Arellano-Bond AR tests that the optimal lag is of order one. Furthermore, because we cannot
have time effects, variables are time-demeaned to remove unwanted trends.
one standard deviation shock of the foreign bank presence variable (lnFBAST). The middle
line is the impulse response, and the two lines above and below are the 95% and 5%
confidence intervals, respectively, obtained from Monte Carlo simulation (we use 500
replications).
In line with hypothesis H1.B, we observe that new firm entry (lnENT) responds positively
and significantly (at the 5% level) to a foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) shock. Furthermore,
this is a long-lasting effect implying that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new
firm entry rate persists over time. Box 1 in Table 6 presents further evidence of the importance
of foreign bank presence for new firm entry as reported by the variance decompositions
(VDCs) estimations. Specifically, around 13.67% of the forecast error variance of new firm
Impulse-responses for 1 lag VAR of lnnewent lnfbast
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 reps
response of lnnewent to lnnewent shock
s
 (p 5) lnnewent  lnnewent
 (p 95) lnnewent
0 6
0.0000
1.8769
response of lnnewent to lnfbast shock
s
 (p 5) lnfbast  lnfbast
 (p 95) lnfbast
0 6
0.0000
0.3895
response of lnfbast to lnnewent shock
s
 (p 5) lnnewent  lnnewent
 (p 95) lnnewent
0 6
-0.1489
0.6632
response of lnfbast to lnfbast shock
s
 (p 5) lnfbast  lnfbast
 (p 95) lnfbast
0 6
0.0000
2.9481
Fig. 1 The effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry –Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) from Panel
VAR estimation. Note: lnENT stands for the natural logarithm of new entry density and lnFBAST is the natural
logarithm of foreign bank assets over total bank assets
Table 6 The effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry and nascent entrepreneurship – Variance
Decompositions (VDCs) from Panel VAR estimation. lnENT stands for the natural logarithm of new firm entry
density, lnNascent is the natural logarithm of nascent entrepreneurship, lnFBAST is the natural logarithm of
foreign bank assets over total bank assets. s denotes periods ahead
Box 1 Box 2
Variables s lnENT lnFBAST Variables s lnNascent lnFBAST
lnENT 10 0.8633 0.1367 lnNascent 10 0.7045 0.2955
lnFBAST 10 0.0159 0.9841 lnFBAST 10 0.0029 0.9971
lnENT 20 0.8524 0.1476 lnNascent 20 0.7041 0.2959
lnFBAST 20 0.0176 0.9824 lnFBAST 20 0.0029 0.9971
lnENT 30 0.8518 0.1482 lnNascent 30 0.7041 0.2959
lnFBAST 30 0.0177 0.9823 lnFBAST 30 0.0029 0.9971
entry (lnENT) after 10 years is explained by foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) disturbances.
We obtain similar results (See Box 2 in Table 6 and Fig. 2) from the panel VAR specification
when we employ the alternative entrepreneurship variable (lnNascent).
5 Conclusion
This study finds that foreign bank presence exerts a positive and significant effect on new firm
entry. Furthermore, the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry subdues at
higher levels of creditor rights but strengthens at higher levels of information sharing. The
former result indicates, from an entrepreneurship standpoint, that foreign bank presence could
substitute for weak legal structures in the host economies. The latter finding provides evidence
that foreign banks could particularly benefit entrepreneurship when a host economy has in
place a strong information sharing infrastructure. This could enable foreign banks to reduce the
information asymmetries they face in the host economy by enabling the use of their advanced
lending technologies such as credit scoring.
In further analysis, we provide evidence that the information sharing provider matters.
More specifically, we find that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry
strengthens in the presence of a private credit bureau but subdues in the presence of public
credit registry. Private credit bureaus, by providing rich information on the credit history of a
wide range of potential borrowers, as for example small borrowers, and the provision of
additional services such as credit scoring, reduce the information asymmetry between foreign
Impulse-responses for 1 lag VAR of lnnascent lnfbast
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 reps
response of lnnascent to lnnascent shock
s
 (p 5) lnnascent  lnnascent
 (p 95) lnnascent
0 6
-0.0178
0.3736
response of lnnascent to lnfbast shock
s
 (p 5) lnfbast  lnfbast
 (p 95) lnfbast
0 6
0.0000
0.2145
response of lnfbast to lnnascent shock
s
 (p 5) lnnascent  lnnascent
 (p 95) lnnascent
0 6
-0.0171
0.0138
response of lnfbast to lnfbast shock
s
 (p 5) lnfbast  lnfbast
 (p 95) lnfbast
0 6
0.0000
0.1019
Fig. 2 The effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry –Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) from Panel
VAR estimation with alternative measure of entrepreneurship. Note: lnNascent stands for the natural logarithm of
nascent entrepreneurship and lnFBAST is the natural logarithm of foreign bank assets over total bank assets
banks and the opaque entrepreneurship credit market segment and thus facilitate foreign bank
lending to entrepreneurial efforts. Finally, we also provide some evidence that distance
between the home and host economies in terms of information sharing and culture weakens
the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry.
These empirical findings have some important policy implications. Governments,
especially in countries with weak legal structure, could try to attract foreign bank
investment in order to enhance the entrepreneurship rates in their economies. Further-
more, governments in countries where already foreign bank presence is high could
focus on improving the information sharing infrastructure of their banking system,
especially through private credit bureaus, in order to facilitate foreign bank lending to
entrepreneurs.
Appendix 1
Table 7 Countries included in the analysis. The selection of countries reflects the availability of the dependent
and the explanatory variables of the analysis
Albania Denmark Korea, Rep. Portugal Uruguay
Algeria Dominican Republic Kyrgyz Republic Romania Uzbekistan
Armenia El Salvador Latvia Rwanda Zambia
Australia Estonia Lithuania Senegal
Austria Finland Luxembourg Serbia
Azerbaijan France Macedonia, FYR Singapore
Belarus Georgia Mauritius Slovak Republic
Belgium Germany Moldova Slovenia
Bolivia Ghana Mongolia South Africa
Bosnia and Herzegovina Greece Montenegro Spain
Botswana Guatemala Morocco Sweden
Bulgaria Hong Kong, China Namibia Switzerland
Burkina Faso Hungary Nepal Thailand
Canada Ireland Netherlands Togo
Chile Israel New Zealand Tunisia
Colombia Italy Niger Turkey
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jamaica Norway Uganda
Costa Rica Jordan Peru Ukraine
Croatia Kazakhstan Philippines UAE
Czech Republic Kenya Poland United Kingdom
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Appendix 3. Additional information on the validity of instrumental variables
The findings in Table 5 demonstrate that the instrumental variables that measure foreign bank
regulatory restrictions (RESFB) and foreign bank denied applications (DENBFB) have a negative
and significant at the 1% level effect on the foreign bank presence variable (lnFBNUM). Here we
provide evidence from fixed effect models that these instrumental variables (RESFB and
DENFB) do not exert a statistically significant direct effect on our measures of entrepreneurship
(lnNewentry and lnNascent). Themodels in Table A3 include also the other explanatory variables
of entrepreneurship that we do not report in this table to economize space. We further validate the
weak and not statistically significant relationship between the two instrumental variables and the
two measures of entrepreneurships in panel VAR models.
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